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I. INTRODUCTION 
Easter Island, once densely populated with thousands of lush-trees, 
is now a barren landscape.1 Polynesians, the original inhabitants, 
recklessly destroyed Easter Island’s environment to make the large 
statues that now bring the island fame.2 As the legend goes, tree after 
tree was cut down, until only a single tree was left standing. Without 
fearing the consequences, a man went up and cut down the last standing 
tree. Some ecologists believe the society fell into utter chaos and 
eventually collapsed from cannibalism and starvation.3  
Many ecologists, like Jared Diamond, a highly published scholar, 
have compared the legend of Easter Island’s demise with our current 
consumption of the world’s natural resources.4 Diamond and others 
correctly believe that the current depletion of our world’s natural 
resources will result in the collapse of modern society if not managed 
quickly.5 Currently, freshwater resources are exploited at an alarming 
rate, and it is becoming increasingly necessary to develop effective and 
manageable frameworks between states.  
This article attempts to create an institutional framework to manage 
transboundary ground water resources by examining the Nubian 
Sandstone Aquifer’s water management system. Part I is an overview of 
groundwater (or aquifers) and the importance of protecting these 
resources. Part II is an overview of the institutional theory and how the 
institutional theory applies to the Nubian Aquifer. Part III gives 
                                                          
1.  See TERRY HUNT, STATUTES THAT WALKED: UNRAVELING THE MYSTERY OF 
EASTER ISLAND (Counterpoint Press 2012).  
2.  Terry Hunt & Carl Lipo, Revisiting Rapa Nui (Easter Island) “Ecocide”, 63 
PACIFIC SCIENCE 601 (2009).  
3.  See LENORE WEISS, CUTTING DOWN THE LAST TREE ON EASTER ISLAND 12 
(2012).   
4.  See JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SOCIETIES 107 
(2013).  
5.  Id. at 3.  
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background on the natural characteristics of the Nubian Aquifer. Part IV 
discusses the current state of international law regarding shared water 
resources, specifically regarding sovereignty and suggested management 
principles. Part V analyzes the most successful mechanisms in the 
Nubian Aquifer’s Strategic Action Programme (SAP) and identifies 
potential threats to SAP’s future in the region. Finally, Part VI creates an 
institutional framework based on SAP and other international norms for 
future states to implement. This section also identifies other threatened 
transboundary aquifers that should apply these types of institutions.  
II. OVERVIEW OF AQUIFERS AND WATER 
Water is essential to life and is a fundamental resource that is 
seriously depleting.6 Currently, over 2.5 billion people are without 
access to adequate sanitation;7 900 million people have no access to 
freshwater;8 and, 2 million people die every year from diseases spawned 
by unsafe drinking water and inadequate sanitation.9 Unfortunately, most 
of the world with access to freshwater continue to consume it at an 
                                                          
6.  See generally U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 
2003); see also, U.N. Charter art. 55; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, arts. 11 and 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; G.A. Res 217 (III) A, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. Office 
of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 35, The Right to Water (2010). 
7.  World Health Organization & U.N. Children’s Fund, Progress on Sanitation 
and Drinking-Water: 2013 Update, 3, 5, and 8 (2013), 
https://www.unicef.org/wash/files/JMP2013final_en.pdf. 
8.  World Health Organization & U.N. Children’s Fund, Drinking Water: Equity, 
Safety and Sustainability,17 (2011), 
https://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/report_wash_low.pdf. 
9.  Id.  
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unsustainable rate,10 and they are unaware of the true freshwater crisis 
we are facing.11 
Most who are aware of the freshwater crisis do not understand the 
true scarcity of water.12 Over 97% of the world’s water is unusable salt 
water,13 and most freshwater is inaccessible, frozen in glaciers and ice 
caps.14 The second largest stores of freshwater on Earth are in 
underground aquifers: some 99% is contained in the 275 known aquifers 
around the world.15  
A common misconception is that aquifers are underground water 
tanks filled with freshwater. Aquifers are layers of unconsolidated and 
consolidated material, for example sand and sandstone, respectively.16 
Aquifers are usually bound by an impermeable bed, which must be 
directly drilled into to extract water.17 Unlike traditional watercourses, 
such as rivers, aquifers will likely not be replenished, especially after the 
                                                          
10.  The international community has recognized as much. On the first World 
Water Day, in 1993, the importance of freshwater was first globally recognized. See 
G.A. Res. 47/193, Observance of World Day for Water (Dec. 22, 1992). However, due 
to the limited availability of freshwater, it continues to be difficult for many states, both 
developing and industrialized, to gain access to freshwater, let alone implement 
methods for sustainable water use. See id; see also G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our 
World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Goal No. 6 (Oct. 21, 2015). 
Most recently, in 2015, the United Nations adopted Sustainable Development Goal 6, 
which “ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.” 
Id. 
11.  Renee Martin-Nagle, Fossil Aquifers: A Common Heritage of Mankind, 2 
GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39 (2011).  
12.  PETER GLEICK, An Introduction to Global Fresh Water Issues, in WATER IN 
CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 3 (Peter Gleick ed., 
1993).  
13.  Id.  
14.  IGOR A. SHIKLOMANOV, World Fresh Water Resources, in WATER IN CRISIS: 
A GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 13 (Peter Gleick ed., 1993).  
15.  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 
International Hydrological Programme, Atlas of Transboundary Aquifers: Global 
maps, regional cooperation and local inventories, 16 and 61, U.N. Doc. SC-
2009/WS/22 (2009) [hereinafter UNESCO-IHP Atlas of Transboundary Aquifers] (a 
projected launched by UNESCO-IHP in 1999 to collect hydrogeological information 
at a global scale on these specific types of resources).  
16.  See PHILLIPPE QUEVAUVILLER, General Introduction: The Need to Protect 
Groundwater, in GROUNDWATER SCIENCE AND POLICY 3, 5 (Phillippe Quevaulviller 
ed., 2008) [hereinafter QUEVAULVILLER].  
17.  Id.  
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groundwater is fully extracted.18 This is important because groundwater 
is a major source of surface water that countries and their populations 
around the world rely on.19  
There are many different classifications of aquifer, however this 
article looks specifically at non-rechargeable aquifers–aquifers not 
connected to surface water. Non-rechargeable aquifers are similar to 
fossil fuels because once water is extracted from the ground the water is 
essentially permanently removed.20 However, unlike fossil fuels there is 
no alternative to water.21  
Given the limited nature or water and the consequences of 
permanent depletion, governing the use of non-rechargeable aquifers is 
especially difficult.22 Gabriel Eckstein, a preeminent scholar of 
transboundary aquifers, explained, non-rechargeable aquifers by 
definition “cannot be sustainably exploited.”23 Any management plan 
must consider this unique characteristic when determining how aquifer 
countries may fairly utilize these vital freshwater resources.24 
Since aquifers are underground, a lack of information about their 
contents and visual notice of depletion has led numerous states to 
reckless exploitation.25 Up until the United Nations Economic, Scientific 
                                                          
18.  See generally Yoram Eckstein & Gabriel E. Eckstein, Transboundary 
Aquifers: Conceptual Models for Development of International Law, 43 NAT’L 
GROUND WATER ASS’N 679, 685 (2005) [hereinafter Conceptual Models for 
Transboundary Aquifers].  
19.  QUEVAULVILLER, supra note 16, at 3.  
20.  Conceptual Models for Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 18, at 685. 
21.  Id. 
22.  JOEL R. GAT, ISOTOPE HYDROLOGY: A STUDY OF THE WATER CYCLE 136 
(2010). Non-rechargeable aquifers are difficult to govern in an adequate and sustainable 
way because there is a limited amount of water that will not be replenished by a normal 
water cycle. Id.  
23.  Conceptual Models for Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 18, at 685.  
24.  See G.A. Res. 64/10, Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, 42 (May 29, 
2008) [hereinafter TBA Articles]; Francesco Sindico & Gabriel Eckstein, The Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers: Many Ways of Going Forward, but Only One Way of 
Standing Still, 23 REV. EUR. COMM. INTL’L EVTL. L. 32, 33 (2014).  
25.  See FRED PEARCE, WHEN THE RIVERS RUN DRY 35-39 (2006) (discussing 
how major sections of the world are pumping water from underground sources at an 
uncontrolled and reckless pace); see also Aaron Worthen, Resolving International 
Water Disputes Lessons from American and Canadian Federalism, 11 BYU INT’L L. 
MGMT. REV. 132, 135 (2015). 
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and Cultural Organization’s (“UNESCO”) Atlas of Transboundary 
Aquifers in 2009, there was no comprehensive identification or mapping 
of these vital resources.26 Presently, aquifer utilization ranges from total 
reliance on groundwater for a state’s survival27 to extraction of water for 
purely profitable purposes.28  
III. OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONALISM  
In international law, institutions have long been used as a way to 
promote and maintain co-operation between otherwise self-interested 
states.29 Institutions are defined as “persistent and connected set of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, 
and shape expectations.”30 Institutions contribute to co-operation in two 
major ways. First, institutions force actors to think about the long-term 
relationship between interested parties.31 Second, institutions increase 
the importance of reciprocity and a state’s reputation in international 
law.32 Moreover, institutions have the power to create neutral and stable 
environments that promote decisions that are mutually beneficial and 
guide state behavior.33  
This Comment takes an institutionalist approach to examine the 
framework created to protect and manage the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer 
(“Nubian Aquifer”). The Nubian Aquifer is located in one of the world’s 
driest regions: Northeastern Africa. Famines, droughts, civil wars, 
demographic pressures, and political instability continue to plague the 
region.34 Despite such overwhelming obstacles, Chad, Libya, Sudan, and 
                                                          
26.  Resolving International Water Disputes, supra note 25, at 135–136. 
27.  UNESCO-IHP Atlas on Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 15, at 16 
(nearly two million people rely totally on groundwater extracted from the aquifers to 
survive).  
28.  Conceptual Models for Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 18, at 685.  
29.  Barbara Koremenos, Institutionalism and International Law (Aug. 29, 2011), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1919309.  
30.  William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal 
Scholarship, 12 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 227, 241 (1997) (quoting Robert O. Keohane, 
International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 379, 386 (1988)). 
31.  Aceves, supra note 30, at 242; see also Worthen, supra note 25, at 133.  
32.  See Worthen, supra note 25, at 133.  
33.  See Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions, 16 
INT’L REV. L. ECON. 121, 127 (1996).   
34.  See discussion infra sec. V.C.2.   
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Egypt–the countries that share the Nubian Aquifer–have successfully 
created and implemented a regional framework, the Nubian Aquifer’s 
SAP, to manage the Nubian Aquifer.35 These four states’ success with 
SAP in a region with limited economic resources and increasing 
demographic pressure, makes it a worthy case study.  
The two most successful institutional mechanisms of the Nubian 
Aquifer’s SAP are the administrative body (Joint Authority) and the 
informational system (Nubian Aquifer Regional Information System).36 
This article will explain how international law has created a platform for 
SAP to be successful, and will draw from the SAP example to ultimately 
identify three institutions necessary for any future framework managing 
non-rechargeable transboundary aquifers: (1) independent 
administrative bodies; (2) a regional informational system; and (3) fair 
apportionment factors.  
III. BACKGROUND ON THE NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER SYSTEM 
The Nubian Aquifer has been described as a “liquid gold mine” for 
Chad, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt (Aquifer States).37 It is one of the largest 
aquifers in the world, ranging nearly 2.2 million square kilometers in size 
and is utilized by the four water-strapped countries.38 The Nubian 
Aquifer is a non-rechargeable confined aquifer, which means it is not 
connected to surface water and any water utilized will not replenish.39 
Currently, the Nubian Aquifer contains 6.5 million cubic mega meters of 
water.40 However, within the past forty years, the Aquifer States have 
exponentially increased their extraction of water from the Aquifer.41  
                                                          
35.  See discussion infra sec. V.C.  
36.  See discussion infra sec. V.B. and VI.  
37.  Russell Sticklor, Libya Unrest Threatens to Derail Water Diplomacy in 
North Africa, World Pol. Rev. (July 2015), 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16148/libya-unrest-threatens-to-derail-
water-diplomacy-in-north-africa. 
38.  Conceptual Models for Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 18, at 685.  
39.  UNESCO-IHP Atlas of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 15, at 276.  
40.  UNESCO INTERNATIONAL HYDROLOGICAL PROGRAM, NON-RENEWABLE 
GROUNDWATER RESOURCES: A GUIDEBOOK ON SOCIALLY-SUSTAINABLE 
MANAGEMENT FOR WATER-POLICY MAKERS, 32, U.N. Doc. SC-2007/WS/4 (eds. 
Stephen Foster & Daniel Pl Loucks, 2006) [hereinafter UNESCO GUIDEBOOK].  
41.  UNESCO-IHP Atlas of Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 15, at 277.  
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Despite the dramatic increase in utilization of the Nubian Aquifer, 
both Egypt and Libya have used a miniscule portion of the water.42 
Egypt’s New Valley Project and Libya’s Great Man-Made River are 
responsible for increased extraction, but there is no historical data for 
Chad and Sudan’s use of the Nubian Aquifer.43 However, given the large 
supply of confined water, it is only a matter of time before they too begin 
utilizing the Aquifer, making it susceptible to reckless exploitation. 
Therefore, it is critical the four states cooperate to ensure equitable use. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING AQUIFERS AND OTHER WATER 
RESOURCES 
The principles of international law governing management and 
utilization of water sources can be derived from a variety of sources. The 
current guidelines for international watercourses are important to 
analyze because the frameworks for various transboundary aquifers, 
including the Nubian Aquifer, are largely derived from these 
international norms. It should be noted, however, that while these 
sources set international norms regarding transboundary aquifers, they 
do not provide a solution to the natural conflict between states’ sovereign 
rights to utilize water in a transboundary aquifer and their obligations 
towards other aquifer states.44 Therefore, the focus of this section is the 
norm of territorial sovereignty, how the concept has been introduced in 
international water management, and how these sources of law 
facilitated a platform for regional water management agreements.  
A.  International Law Regarding Territorial Sovereignty 
International law is fundamentally based on the territorial 
sovereignty of states.45 It provides states the “inalienable right”46 to 
                                                          
42.  UNESCO Guidebook, supra note 40, at 32.  
43.  Id. 
44.  See Martin-Nagle, supra note 11, at 42.  
45.  See, e.g., S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 
at 47 (Sept. 7).  
46.  G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
(Dec. 14, 1962) (adopted by an 87 – 2 vote with 12 abstentions and 9 non-voting 
members), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html; see, e.g., U.N. Charter 
arts. 2, 55, and 73; see generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 
[UNCLOS] art. 2, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Vienna Convention on 
8
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freely utilize natural resources located within their territory and to 
economically develop the country.47 This has important implications for 
a state’s right of self-determination within the international 
community.48 Moreover, sovereignty over natural resources is arguably 
a state’s most powerful tool to provide citizens with basic human 
rights,49 of relevance here, the right to an adequate standard of living, 
including safe, clean water.50  
However, sovereignty over transboundary shared resources invokes 
the sovereign equality of all states within whose territory the resource is 
located.51 In this context, sovereignty is inherently limited because a 
state must exercise its rights without interfering with another state’s 
                                                          
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties [VCSSRT] art. 13, Aug. 23, 1978 entered 
into force Nov. 6, 1996, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3 (“every state has permanent sovereignty over 
its natural wealth and resources”).  
47.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change preamble, 
Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 166; Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone 
Layer preamble, Mar. 22, 1985, 1771 U.N.T.S. 407;Convention on Biological Diversity 
preamble, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79; Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in 
Africa preamble, Oct. 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Sustainable 
Management of Lake Tanganyika preamble, June 12, 2003, 2338 U.N.T.S. 43; African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 21, adopted June 27, 1981, entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1986, 21 I.L.M. 58; Convention for the Protection of the Natural 
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region art. 4, adopted Nov. 24, 1986, 
entered into force Aug. 22, 1990, 26 I.L.M. 38; Protocol on Water and Health to the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes art. 5, June 17, 1999, 2331 U.N.T.S. 202; African Convention on 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources art. 7, Sept. 15, 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 
3. 
48.  G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), supra note 46.  
49.  SIBYLLE SCHEIPERS, NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 6, 82 (2013). See 
also TBA Articles, supra note 24, arts. 3 and 5(2).  
50.  See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 6; ICESCR, supra note 6, arts. 11, 12; U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The 
Right to Water, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); see also, U.N. Charter art. 
55; G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 
35, The Right to Water (2010). 
51.  See SCHEIPERS, supra note 49, at 82; see also U.N. Charter arts. 1, 2, 55, and 
78.  
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rights to the same resource.52 International law provides two essential 
limitations to sovereignty in this regard with respect to water resources: 
(1) equitable utilization,53 and (2) an obligation not to cause significant 
harm.54 However, these principles do not fully solve the fundamental 
conflict that exists between a state’s right to utilize its natural resources 
and another state’s rights to use the same resource.55  
Naturally, states have used the concept of territorial sovereignty to 
protect their respective interests over transboundary aquifers.56 Limiting 
state sovereignty through regional institutions is one practical solution.57 
The next section will discuss the importance of regional institutions 
established through various international treaties that attempt to govern 
international watercourses.  
B. International Law Association’s Rules on Groundwater 
In 1967, the International Law Association (ILA), a non-
governmental organization, was tasked with codifying international law 
regarding watercourses.58 ILA created the first modern framework to 
manage shared water resources through the adoption of the Helsinki 
                                                          
52.  See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); 
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).  
53.  See, e.g., Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), Judgment, 1997 
I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) (recognizing the rights of states who share natural resources); TBA 
Articles, supra note 24, arts. 4 and 5; G.A. Res. 51/149, Convention on the Law of 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 4–6, adopted May 21, 1997 
entered into force Aug. 17, 2014 U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/149 [hereinafter Watercourse 
Convention].  
54.  TBA Articles, supra note 24, art. 6; UNCLOS, supra note 46, art. 2; 
Watercourse Convention, supra note 53, art. 7.  
55.  See generally TBA Articles, supra note 24, art. 3, cmt. 3; see also Nadia 
Sánchez Castillo, Differentiating between Sovereignty over Exclusive and Shared 
Resources in the Light of Future Discussion on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 24 
REV. EUR. COMM. INT’L ENVTL. L (R.E.C.I.E.L) 1 (2015) (It is also important to note 
that the principle not to cause harm is not an absolute limitation on sovereignty; it only 
requires a state to take “all appropriate measures” to not harm another state’s rights).  
56.  Castillo, supra note 55, at 2.  
57.  Elizabeth Burleson, Middle Eastern and North African Hydropolitics: From 
Eddies of Indecision to Emerging International Law, 18 GEO. INT’L EVNTL. L. REV. 
385, 423–24 (2006).  
58.  See generally, International Law Association, Constitution of the Association 
(adopted in 1873 revised in 2016).  
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Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers.59 These rules 
apply to both surface and ground water and discuss various topics, such 
as equitable utilization, water pollution, and procedures to prevent and 
settle disputes.60  
Most notably, a large portion of the provisions in the Helsinki Rules 
are devoted to creating a framework for the prevention and settlement of 
disputes.61 Article 29 recommends that states communicate with one 
another regarding proposed constructions and activities, relevant data, 
and any alteration in the government’s policy toward the shared resource 
to avoid disputes  altogether.62 Moreover, Article 31 recognizes and 
recommends the use of a “joint agency” to manage disputes and report 
on issues regarding the resource.63  
In 1986, the ILA adopted the Seoul Rules on International 
Groundwater, which specifically looked at the interdependence of 
international aquifers and the best ways to protect and manage aquifers.64 
Since the Seoul Rules only contained four articles, the articles lack an 
in-depth analysis and groundwater policy;65 however, they echo the same 
recommendation of the Helsinki Rules—transparency of information 
and regional management institutions.66  
                                                          
59.  See Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Second Conf., 
Michelle R. Sergent, Comparison of the Helsinki Rules to the 1997 U.N. Draft Articles: 
Will the Progression of International Watercourse Law be Dammed?, 8 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 435, 437 (1997) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]; see also Justin Carlson, Note, A 
Critical Resource or Just a Wishing Well? A Proposal to Codify the Law on 
Transboundary Aquifers and Establish an Explicit Human Right to Water, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2011).  
60.  Helsinki Rules, supra note 59, arts. 2, 4, and 16.  
61.  See generally id. arts. 26–37.  
62.  Id. art. 29. 
63.  Id. art. 31; ILA, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Second Conf., The Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. XXXI (1966).  
64.  ILA, Rep. on the Work of its Sixty-Second Conf., The Seoul Rules on 
International Groundwaters, (1968) [hereinafter Seoul Rules]. 
65.  See generally id.  
66.  Id. arts. III-IV (Article III recommends basin states exchange information 
and cooperate with each other about shared groundwater. Article IV calls for states to 
enter into integrated management frameworks regarding the specific resources). 
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Most recently, in 2004, the ILA adopted the Berlin Rules on Water 
Resources.67 The Berlin Rules are seventy-three articles identifying the 
international law applicable to the management of all types of 
watercourses. Although not legally binding, the Berlin Rules focus on 
the human right to water and how to responsibly manage these depleting 
resources.68 Responsible management focuses on recognizing the need 
for public information,69 equitable cooperation between states,70 and 
identified preferences on how to use water resources.71 Although the ILA 
sources create a clear framework for utilization and management of 
transboundary aquifers, there are no enforcement mechanisms to compel 
states to comply with the Helsinki, Seoul, or Berlin Rules. 
C. Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
In 1970, the International Law Commission (“ILC”), a subsidiary 
body of the U.N. General Assembly,72 was given the task of codifying 
customary law regarding international watercourses.73 The ILC drew on 
many of the principles laid out in the Helsinki and Seoul Rules to 
ultimately develop the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourse (Watercourse Convention), which the U.N. 
General Assembly formally adopted in 1997.74  
Similar to the Helsinki Rules, the Watercourse Convention explicitly 
recommends the use of a “joint management mechanism” to sustainably 
develop and promote the optimal utilization of shared watercourses.75 
However, there was a deliberate move among countries not to include 
non-rechargeable aquifers from the Watercourse Convention due to the 
lack of scientific research and information regarding these unique 
                                                          
67.  See ILA, Berlin Conference, Water Resources Law, Fourth Rep. of the Water 
Resources Committee (2004) [hereinafter Berlin Rules]. 
68.  See id. arts. 10–17.  
69.  Id. arts. 18–19. 
70.  Id. arts. 10–12.  
71.  Id. arts. 12–15.  
72.  See G.A. Res. 174 (II) (Nov. 21, 1947) (statute of the International Law 
Commission).  
73.  G.A. Res. 2669 (XXV) (Dec. 8, 1970). 
74.  See generally Watercourse Convention, supra note 53. 
75.  Id. art. 24.  
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resources.76 The Convention remains relevant to non-rechargeable 
aquifer governance, however, because it reinforces the principles of 
cooperation,77 equitable utilization,78 and the obligation not to cause 
significant harm79 as central to utilizing shared resources.  
D. Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers 
After six years of extensive research on groundwater resources, the 
conversation regarding non-rechargeable aquifers had another chance 
for recognition when the ILC proposed the Draft Articles on 
Transboundary Aquifers (TBA Articles) in 2008.80 Significantly, these 
rules set out many of the same policies reflected in the ILA Rules and 
Watercourse Convention.81 However, the TBA Articles also do not 
explicitly address non-rechargeable aquifers. 
The TBA Articles expand the ideas of sovereignty and water 
management for transboundary aquifers in two major ways. First, Article 
3 specifically recognizes a state’s sovereign right to the portion of a 
shared resource within that state’s territory.82 Article 3 embodies the 
inherent conflict between a state’s sovereign right and the exercise of 
that right, because Article 3 notes the “exercise of sovereignty” shall be 
“in accordance with international law.”83 In other words, a state has a 
sovereign right to the resources in its own territory, but that right is 
limited by other principles of international law.84  
Second, there is a notable expansion in the explicit endorsement of 
bilateral and regional institutions to manage these types of unique 
                                                          
76.  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, ¶¶ 6, 
15, 17, and 43, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2) (Nov. 29, 1994); Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater, 135, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/459 (Apr. 4, 1994). 
77.  Watercourse Convention, supra note 53, art. 8.   
78.  Id. arts. 5–6.  
79.  Id. art. 7.  
80.  See TBA Articles, supra note 24.  
81.  Id.  
82.  Id. art. 3 (the first article to mention sovereignty in regards to shared water 
resources). 
83.  Id.  
84.  See generally David D. Brooks, Prioritizing “No Significant Harm” over 
“Reasonable and Equitable” in Governance of Aquifers, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. 
Commentary (Mar. 2015).  
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resources.85 Although international co-operation is a distinct principle in 
international law,86 the Articles directly recommend aquifer states create 
regional institutions and joint management mechanisms to facilitate the 
exchange of information pertaining to aquifers they share and to 
effectively govern them.87 This shift towards regional agreements helped 
to create the platform for the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer States to create 
a working and effective multilateral agreement. 
The U.N. General Assembly’s 2013 Resolution regarding the future 
of the TBA Articles indicates the current trend toward a more concrete 
law regarding transboundary aquifers.88 The 2013 Resolution 
specifically referenced two regional agreements that had incorporated 
the TBA Articles into their management framework: the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as well 
as the Model Provision on Transboundary Groundwater adopted by the 
members of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes.89 The 2013 Resolution also 
“commends to the attention of Governments” that the TBA Articles 
should be guidance for proper management techniques for future 
bilateral and regional instruments.90 
Although international water law regarding non-rechargeable 
aquifers still has a long journey towards codification, at minimum these 
various sources created a platform for states to enter into multilateral 
agreements.91 Indeed, the ILC’s in-depth study on groundwater and other 
international watercourses facilitated the Nubian Aquifer’s SAP. More 
importantly, the push towards regional agreements in place of a universal 
framework has allowed Chad, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt to implement a 
system that is tailored specifically to the unique characteristics of the 
Nubian Aquifer and the region.  
                                                          
85.  Watercourse Convention, supra note 53, arts. 8 and 9. 
86.  U.N. Charter, arts. 1 and 2. See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. 
Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13). 
87.  Watercourse Convention, supra note 53, arts. 8 and 9.  
88.  See generally G.A. Res. 68/118 (Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 
Resolution]; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Toward a More Robust International Water Law 
of Cooperation to Address Droughts and Ecosystem Conservation, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 261, 271 (2016).  
89.  G.A. Res. 68/118, supra note 88, ¶ 1.  
90.  Id.  
91.  Tarlock, supra note 88, at 271.  
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This examination of international law shows the need for regional 
frameworks like SAP.92 Although the Nubian Aquifer’s SAP has created 
institutions to utilize and manage the water in the aquifer, these 
institutions do not fully resolve the conflict between each aquifer state’s 
sovereign right to utilize the Nubian Aquifer and the obligations each 
state owes to each other. 
V. CURRENT STRATEGIC ACTION PROGRAMME BETWEEN THE NUBIAN 
AQUIFER STATES 
On September 18, 2013, SAP was established to address the Nubian 
Aquifer’s main concerns.93 The main driving force behind SAP was 
information: the member states recognized the importance of and need 
for a better understanding of the Nubian Aquifer and its potential use to 
the four Aquifer States.94 Utilizing the Nubian Aquifer raises three key 
transboundary issues: (1) declining water levels related to exploitation; 
(2) damage to the region’s ecosystem and biodiversity; and, (3) 
pollution.95 Although SAP has various important parts, this section will 
focus on two of the most important institutional mechanisms the 
agreement created in attempts to address these issues: the administrative 
body (Joint Authority) and the information center (NARIS). The reason 
for this focus is to highlight the conflict between state sovereignty and 
international tensions arising from over-exploitation of shared resources. 
A. Joint Authority 
One of the most notable mechanisms created to manage the Nubian 
Aquifer is the Joint Authority, an agreement between Chad, Libya, 
Sudan, and Egypt to study and develop the Nubian Aquifer. Libya and 
Egypt first created the Joint Authority in 1989,96 with Sudan joining in 
                                                          
92.  See Carlson, supra note 59, at 1422.  
93.  Regional Strategic Action Programme for the Nubian Aquifer System, Sept. 
18, 2013, http://iwlearn.net/resources/documents/11743 [hereinafter Regional 
Strategic Programme].  
94.  Id. at ix. These main concerns were identified and prepared by all four 
countries and recorded in the Shared Aquifer Diagnostic Analysis. Id. 
95.  Id. at x.  
96.  Id. at 16.  
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1997,97 and Chad in 1999.98 Chad’s entrance led to a revitalization of the 
Joint Authority, and acted as a catalyst to create a regional strategy to 
efficiently manage the Nubian Aquifer.99 With all four Aquifer States 
agreeing to the “Constitution of the Joint Authority for the Study and 
Development of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Waters” (the 
Constitution), the Joint Authority was able to expand its scope and 
authority.100 
The Joint Authority is responsible for major advances in regional 
cooperation between the Aquifer States and their understanding of the 
importance of the Nubian Aquifer.101 The Joint Authority is a major 
influence on the Nubian Aquifer because SAP’s framework gives the 
Joint Authority the ability to regulate state sovereignty to a certain 
extent. Thus, it is important to look at the Joint Authority’s Constitution 
to see how and to what extent the administrative body can exercise its 
power in relation to the four Aquifer States. The Constitution has four 
distinct chapters: (1) Establishment, Headquarters, Purpose and 
Membership; (2) Authority Management; (3) Budget, Accounts and 
Financial Resources; and (4) General Provisions.102 Each will be 
discussed in turn below. 
1. Responsibilities of the Joint Authority 
Chapter 1 of the Constitution consists of four articles and establishes 
the Joint Authority’s headquarters in Tripoli, Libya, with the option for 
each of the member states to create additional branches in their own 
country.103 Article 3 lays out the broad powers the Joint Authority may 
exercise, encompassing a variety of responsibilities, which can be 
                                                          
97.  Id.  
98.  Id.  
99.  Id.  
100.  Id. at xvi and ix.  
101.  Id. at x. 
102.  Constitution of the Joint Authority for the Study and Development of the 
Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Waters 71, Annex 7, Nov. 22, 2004, http://www-
naweb.iaea.org/napc/ih/documents/Nubian/Nubian_final_MSP_Sandstone.pdf 
(English version) [hereinafter Joint Authority Constitution].  
103.  Id. art. 2.  
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divided into three categories: scientific; dissemination and training; and, 
management policies.104  
The scientific responsibilities are to initiate studies to collect 
information on the Aquifer and environmental aspects of the region, 
including how to control desertification in the four countries.105 This 
obligation gives the Joint Authority the ability to gather the data 
necessary to responsibly utilize the resource without obstruction from 
any Aquifer State.106 Moreover, these scientific powers have made the 
Joint Authority an expert on the Aquifer, ensuring the Aquifer is properly 
utilized under a cohesive management plan. 
The Joint Authority is also responsible for disseminating this 
information and training the relevant authorities of member states.107 To 
accomplish this, the Joint Authority organizes symposiums108 to 
facilitate cooperation and train member states when they choose to 
engage in any domestic activities that will affect the Nubian Aquifer.109 
Specifically, the Joint Authority works with the Research Institute for 
Groundwater in Egypt; the General Water Authority in Libya; the Non-
Nile Waters Directorate in Sudan; and, the Directorate de l’Hudraulique, 
le Ministére de l’Environment et de l’Eeau in Chad.110 Each of these act 
as national focal points to implement the Joint Authority’s policies.111 
Arguably the most important power of the Joint Authority is its 
management responsibility, which empowers it to create common 
policies intended to utilize, develop, and ration the Nubian Aquifer’s 
water among the member states.112 It is in this context that the Joint 
                                                          
104.  See id. art. 3; Regional Strategic Programme, supra note 93, at 16. 
105.  Joint Authority Constitution, supra note 102, arts. 2 and 3, ¶ 1. 
106.  Id.  
107.  Id. art. 3 ¶ 5.  
108.  Id. art. 3 ¶ 8.  
109.  Id. art. 3 ¶ 5.  
110.  Formulation of an Action Programme for the Integrated Management of the 
Shared Nubian Aquifer, UNDP/IAEA, 4-5 (Nov. 22, 2004).  
111.  Id.  
112.  Id. art. 3 ¶ 3; see also Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), Four African Nations Agree to Water Management Programme, Joint 
IAEA/UNDP-GEF Press Release 2013/12 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Press 
Release]. 
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Authority considers and adopts the scientific information it has gathered 
as a basis for proper water management for the entire region.113  
2. Structural Organization of the Joint Authority 
The Joint Authority’s management structure allows all four Aquifer 
States to fully participate in making decisions and fulfilling 
responsibilities. The Joint Authority is managed by a board of directors, 
which consists of three directors from each state.114 The relevant 
ministries in each state appoint three directors at their discretion.115 
Every year, each state takes a turn appointing a new chair to the board of 
directors.116 The chair acts on behalf of the Joint Authority and 
represents the Joint Authority in its interactions with other states and 
non-state actors.117 The chair can also invite representatives of 
international organizations, donor states, and institutions to attend the 
board meetings as observers.118 A quorum of two thirds of the members 
is required to be considered a valid board meeting.119 However, if a 
quorum cannot be reached, the second called board meeting will be 
“valid if attended by any number of members.”120  
The board of directors has jurisdiction and control over the policies, 
finances, and organizational structure of the Joint Authority;121 and, the 
board must approve most of these actions through a majority vote.122 
However, issues regarding the Joint Authority’s budget, relationships 
with regional and international organizations, and opening of new offices 
or accepting new members require a two-third majority.123  
Finally, the board of directors has two other major tools to 
implement the board’s decisions regarding the use of the Nubian 
Aquifer. First, the board of directors directly nominates an executive 
                                                          
113.  Joint Authority Constitution, supra note 102, art. 3 ¶ 4.  
114.  Id. art. 5.  
115.  Id.  
116.  Id. art. 6; see also Regional Strategic Programme, supra note 93, at 17.   
117.  Joint Authority Constitution, supra note 102, art. 11.  
118.  Id. art. 9.  
119.  Id. art. 8.  
120.  Id.  
121.  Regional Strategic Programme, supra note 93, at 18.  
122.  Joint Authority Constitution, supra note 102, art. 8.  
123.  Id.  
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general director for a period of three years.124 The executive general 
director has the power to execute the recommendations and resolutions 
adopted by the board of directors.125 Second, the Constitution provides 
for an administrative body for the Joint Authority to execute the 
recommendations and resolutions of the board of directors.126  
3. Funding of the Joint Authority’s Policies 
The Joint Authority is primarily funded through member state 
contributions based on their share of the Nubian Aquifer.127 Although 
this is the general way the Joint Authority is funded, the Joint Authority 
also accepts “donations from national and international institutions and 
organizations and donor countries.”128 This gives the Joint Authority the 
power to receive funds from organizations like UNESCO, the World 
Bank, and other international and national bodies who want to support 
sustainable development.  
All the funds are transferred to a bank operating in Libya, the Joint 
Authority’s seat country.129 The Joint Authority’s board of directors 
creates a budget every fiscal year.130 The budget is then submitted to the 
governments of the member states three months before the beginning of 
the next fiscal year.131 Once approved, the Joint Authority is only 
allowed to pursue expenditures directly approved by the board of 
directors.132 The Joint Authority is also given the ability to enter into 
financial obligations beyond the annual budget if the value of the 
obligations will not exceed the total allocated costs. 133   
                                                          
124.  Id. art. 13. 
125.  Id.  
126.  Id. art. 14.  
127.  Id. art. 16.  
128.  Id. art. 21.  
129.  Id. art. 19.  
130.  Id. art. 17.  
131.  Id.  
132.  Id. art. 20.  
133.  Id. arts. 20–22.  
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4. Other General Provisions 
The last chapter of the Constitution officially enacts the by-laws and 
gives the board of directors the ability to adopt amendments, if 
necessary, by a two-thirds vote of the board of directors.134 The chapter 
also reinforces the rights of the board of directors to create internal by-
laws and administrative and financial regulations “without being bound” 
by the regulations in current member countries. 135 Finally, this chapter 
looks to the Arab States League for initial financial and administrative 
regulations until the Joint Authority can create a detailed one of its 
own.136   
B. Nubian Aquifer Regional Information System (NARIS) 
The Joint Authority requires relevant and up to date information to 
make informed decisions. NARIS was initially hard to implement 
because of a lack of funding.137 However, after the revitalization of the 
Joint Authority, NARIS is now an integral part of both national and 
regional cooperation.138 NARIS is responsible for researching, 
gathering, and consolidating data regarding any information related to 
the Nubian Aquifer.139 NARIS works with each state, individually and 
collectively, to implement SAP and record any other concerns or 
information on a state’s development.140  
SAP’s success is partially due to NARIS having the necessary 
information to work with both the Aquifer States and international 
organizations to implement and develop this strategic framework. 
However, the task to fully understand the world’s largest fossil aquifer 
                                                          
134.  Id. art. 24–26. 
135.  Id. art. 24. 
136.  Id. art. 25.  
137.  Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe 
[CEDARE], Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) M&E Rapid Assessment 
Report”, 4 (May 2013), 
http://www.cedare.int/namcow/attachments/article/218/Nubian%20Sandstone%20Aq
uifer%20System%20NSAS%20Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Rapid%20Ass
ess~.pdf [hereinafter M&E Report]. 
138.  See Regional Strategic Programme, supra note 93, at 16. 
139.  Id. at x.  
140.  Id.  
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is difficult; there is still a “lack of area-wide data concerning various 
“geological structures, hydraulic parameters”, and other information.141 
NARIS is dedicated solely to collecting and analyzing data to create 
a better understanding of the Nubian Aquifer’s specific logistics and its 
role in the surrounding community.142 NARIS has helped Aquifer States 
understand the impact of their actions on the region’s water level and 
quality. This informational system has also created uniformity and 
transparent information that is easily accessible to member states and 
other stakeholders.143  
Another important function of NARIS is its ability to continuously 
exchange information between member states. One of the main 
agreements in SAP is to monitor and exchange information exclusively 
through NARIS.144 The agreement also required NARIS to set up the 
information on a server that is accessible through the Internet.145 
NARIS’s user-friendly interface allows uniform and transparent 
information to flow continuously between member states.146 
Currently, the Joint Authority has commissioned specialists to 
enhance the web-based information system.147 The Joint Authority 
requires the most current information to create tailored policies 
maximizing the benefits of the Nubian Aquifer and minimizing the 
potential harm to each respective state. Thus, NARIS is an essential tool 
for the Joint Authority to update its current informational system.  
C. Potential Threats to the Nubian’s Strategic Action Programme 
The Nubian Aquifer is found in four developing states that are 
plagued with increasing demographic pressures, severe droughts, and 
political instability.148 This section will examine the two biggest threats 
to the future of SAP within the region: each state’s disproportional needs 
                                                          
141.  M&E Report, supra note 137, at 44.  
142.  Id. at 4. 
143.  Id. at 44.  
144.  Id.  
145.  Id. at 41.  
146.  Id.  
147.  Id. at 42.  
148.  See Nicholas Maxwell, Note, The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System: 
Thoughts on a Multilateral Treaty in Light of the 2008 UN Resolution on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 379 (2011).  
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and the current political instability in the region. These threats are also 
common among other developing countries that share access to 
transboundary aquifers.149  
1. Disproportional Use Among the Sharing States 
Although the Nubian Aquifer framework has been able to create a 
strong administrative body based on information and real authority, it 
does not fully resolve the discrepancy between territorial sovereignty and 
reasonable utilization of shared resources. One of the main threats to the 
Nubian Aquifer is over-exploitation because all four states have severely 
limited access to water.150 The Nubian Aquifer has been “actively 
pumped” since the 1960’s to supply Libya with irrigation and other water 
supplies.151 Recently, over-extraction has already begun to affect certain 
recharge zones.152 All four countries disproportionally rely on the 
Nubian Aquifer for a variety of reasons. Additionally, the region’s 
drinking and agriculture water demands could double within the next 50-
100 years.153 Therefore, it is important to create an apportionment system 
that is fair and sustainable.  
Several physical factors are needed to formulate an apportionment 
system between the four states: “population, percentage of land 
overlying the aquifer, and percentage of total volume under the land of 
the aquifer.”154 The current factors for all four states break down as 
follows: 
 Chad – 12.8 million (population), 11% (land coverage), and 
12.8% (aquifer water)155  
 Sudan – 38 million (population), 17% (land coverage), and 
9% (aquifer water)156  
                                                          
149.  See QUEVAUVILLER, supra note 16, at 13.  
150.  See IAEA Water Resources Programme, Transboundary Aquifers and River 
Basins: Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (2011).  
151.  Id.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Id.  
154.  Ryan Carl Dolezal, The Nubian Sandstone Aquifer Dispute, 7 PANGEA J. 3 
(2016), sites.stedwards.edu/pangaea/the-nubian-sandstone-aquifer-dispute/.  
155.  Id.  
156.  Id.  
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/8
Gaglio camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2017  11:24 AM 
2017] THE NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER 215 
 Libya – 6.2 million (population), 34% (land coverage), and 
36.6% (aquifer water)157 
 Egypt – 82 million (population), 38% (land coverage), and 
41.5% (aquifer water)158 
Another important factor to consider when determining 
apportionment is the need and dependency each of the Aquifer States has 
on the aquifer. Currently, Libya depends the most on the Nubian Aquifer, 
relying on groundwater for nearly 95% of Libya’s water needs.159 As a 
result, Libya created a four-thousand-kilometer subterranean pipeline to 
directly tap into the Nubian Aquifer.160 Egypt relies on the Nubian 
Aquifer the least, relying on only 7% for agricultural needs.161  
Sudan has the second highest population of the four Aquifer States 
and has the economic ability to begin relying on the Nubian Aquifer.162 
Sudan currently relies on the Nile Nubian Aquifer to meet most of 
Sudan’s water demand.163 However, if the Sudanese government’s 
access to the Nile is threatened,164 the government will surely look into 
tapping into the Nubian Aquifer. Thus, Sudan is in a unique position 
because Sudan arguably has the most to gain from utilizing the 
Aquifer.165  
On the other end of the spectrum, Chad is the least likely and able to 
utilize the Nubian Aquifer. Most of Chad’s population is concentrated in 
the southern half of the country, a region with consistent rainfall and 
vegetation.166 The problem is the Nubian Aquifer is located in the 
                                                          
157.  Id.  
158.  Id.  
159.  Id. at 4. 
160. Ngosa Howard Mpamba, Transboundary Water Management in the 
Zambezi and Congo River Basins: A Situation Analysis, in FREE FLOW: REACHING 
WATER SECURITY THROUGH COOPERATION 92 (UNESCO 2013) (also known as the 
Great Man-made River).  
161.  Dolezal, supra note 154, at 4. 
162.  Id. at 6.  
163.  Id.  
164.  There is a current dispute over a dam project in Ethiopia that will affect both 
Egypt and Sudan. For a full article on the dispute see, Sticklor, supra note 37. 
165.  Dolezal, supra note 154, at 6.  
166.  Id at 5 
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northern part of Chad, and the state is not economically able to build the 
infrastructure necessary to fully utilize the Nubian Aquifer.167  
All four states currently use the Nubian Aquifer disproportionally; 
thus, future apportionment should be based on the reasonable needs of 
each of the Aquifer States. SAP recognizes the importance of the Nubian 
Aquifer in the region and has created a framework towards maximizing 
the long-term benefits of this natural resource. SAP has the potential to 
overcome inequitable uses of the Nubian Aquifer because the Joint 
Authority has the ability to directly govern each states’ access to this 
vital resource.  
2. Political Threats Within the Region 
Regional frameworks, including SAP, can only thrive if all member 
states are active and able to provide funding and support. However, for 
a state to allocate resources properly, sufficient economic resources and 
political stability is necessary. Unfortunately, Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and 
Libya have faced political instability for many generations.168 Major 
threats to the political framework include the 2011 Arab Spring protests 
that “radically reshaped the region’s political and security 
environment.”169 Currently, the biggest political threat to the Nubian 
Aquifer is the unrest in Libya.170 When the member states reconvened in 
the spring of 2015 to renew their pledge to the SAP framework, Libya 
was not present.171 For the purposes of this article, a brief overview of 
the current political chaos that has threatened Libya’s stability will be 
helpful.  
Libya’s use of the Nubian Aquifer is based on the former President 
of Libya’s, Muammar Gaddafi, water pipeline, the Great Man-Made 
River (“GMMR”). This project lasted over thirty years, transports over 
six million cubic meters of water every day over 600 miles, and costed 
                                                          
167.  Id.  
168.  See generally Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, et al., The Crisis in North Africa, 
Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Report (April 2015), 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/The%20crisis%20in%20North%20Africa
%20report%202015.pdf.  
169.  Id; see also M&E Report, supra note 137, at 45.  
170.  See generally Sticklor, supra note 37.  
171.  Id.  
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol47/iss2/8
Gaglio camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/5/2017  11:24 AM 
2017] THE NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER 217 
Libya 27 billion dollars.172 However, in 2011, Gaddafi’s reign violently 
ended, and political unrest began.173 Libyan militants, affiliated with the 
Islamic State, have made large territorial gains across Libya, and now 
have control of the infrastructure along the GMMR.174 Control over the 
GMMR is extremely consequential because it is the only resource that 
links much of the “endless sparsely populated and little-secured desert 
terrain.”175  
In May 2016, the United States Institute of Peace issued a report on 
the United States’s work in Libya.176 The report explained the current 
situation in Libya as a “spiral of deteriorating security, economic crisis, 
and political deadlock.”177 Libya’s commitment to the Nubian Aquifer is 
directly reliant on the state’s ability to maintain social and political 
stability. Although Libya is currently away from the management table, 
there are positive signs that Libya will continue its relationship with the 
other Aquifer States in the future.  
Libya’s problems particularly affect the Joint Authority because 
Libya is unable to participate in board meetings, and both the Joint 
Authority’s headquarters and bank are located in Libya. However, the 
Joint Authority’s framework allows for board meetings to continue, even 
if Libya is unable to attend.178 Moreover, the other three member states 
have created national institutions that can both host future board 
meetings and deposit future finances.179   
VI. POTENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR OTHER  
NON-RECHARGEABLE AQUIFERS  
An examination of the Nubian Aquifer’s SAP framework and other 
international sources reveal three institutions key to any successful 
transboundary aquifer framework: (1) a strong administrative body with 
actual authority over member states; (2) an informational center to 
                                                          
172.  Maxwell, supra note 148, at 381.  
173.  See generally Sticklor, supra note 37. 
174.  Id.  
175.  Id.  
176.  UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (USIP), USIP’S WORK IN LIBYA (May 
2016), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Current-Situation-in-Libya_1.pdf.  
177.  Id. 
178.  Joint Authority Constitution, supra note 102, art. 8.  
179.  Id. art. 2.  
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strengthen the understanding of the transboundary aquifer; and (3) an 
apportionment system based on relevant geographic, political, and 
economic factors. This section will describe the structure and benefits 
derived from each proposed institution.  
A. Strong Administrative Body 
Any future management framework must include an administrative 
body similar to the Nubian Aquifer’s Joint Authority. Administrative 
institutions are important because they promote iteration within the 
community.180 All member states would be more inclined to look toward 
the long-term benefits of a successful relationship.181 A strong 
administrative institution makes it less likely that states will defect from 
their obligations, and makes states more likely to accept responsibility 
for violations and less likely to defect from obligations.182 
Despite the numerous threats to the Nubian Aquifer, the Joint 
Authority’s scope and organizational structure allows for a huge 
influence on each individual member state and the shared resource in 
general.183 The scope of a transboundary aquifer’s administrative body 
must be strong enough to make more than mere recommendations. Like 
the Joint Authority’s scope, any administrative body should be given a 
large amount of deference to pursue and implement its decisions. An 
administrative body should also identify three different responsibilities 
within its scope: scientific, management policies, and training and 
dissemination.  
This three-pronged approach strengthens the institutions for a 
variety of reasons. First, the administrative body will have the authority 
to inspect, gather, and collect all scientific information regarding the 
aquifer and the aquifer’s role in the surrounding environment. Second, 
the institution will be able to implement knowledge and information to 
develop sound programs, plans, and policies to most efficiently utilize 
the aquifer. Third, an administrative body will help train and educate 
each member state on the importance and vulnerabilities of the aquifer. 
Thus, the three-pronged approach allows an administrative body to be 
                                                          
180.  Aceves, supra note 30, at 242.  
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. at 245-46.  
183.  See generally 2013 Press Release, supra note 112.  
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equipped with the tools necessary to manage both sharing states and the 
shared resource. 
The organizational structure of potential administrative bodies 
should also reflect the Joint Authority’s current scheme. There are two 
essential parts to any proposed administrative body: a board of directors 
and a chair to the board. First, the board of directors should be equally 
represented by each member state and have jurisdiction over the 
administrative body’s policies, finances, effective control, and 
organizational structure. All board decisions should be adopted by at 
least a majority vote. Special issues like formalizing relationships with 
regional and international organizations or new member states should 
require a two-thirds vote. This structure will allow every member state 
to have an equal say in the decision-making process and encourage co-
operation to pass decisions.  
Another important position is the chair of the board of director. The 
chair will oversee the board of directors and act as the main voice of the 
administrative body. Some of the chair’s responsibilities should include: 
interacting with international organization, states, and other institutions; 
formally inviting organizations and states to attend board meetings; and 
representing the administrative body to outside actors. Currently, the 
Joint Authority appoints a new chair every year, and every year a 
different state is responsible for filling this role.184 The chair creates a 
face for the administrative body, which can act as a strategic focal point 
to gain funding from international organizations. Moreover, each state is 
given the responsibility to be in charge of the board. Also, the member 
states will be more inclined to support the strength of the board’s 
decisions and become intimately involved with the administrative body.  
Any future management framework should include an 
administrative body with the authority to gather information, implement 
policy, and train member states. The administrative body must also 
reflect an organizational scheme that creates a neutral environment for 
each member to voice concerns.  
                                                          
184.  Joint Authority’s Constitution, supra note 102, art. 6; see also Regional 
Strategic Programme, supra note 93, at 17. 
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B. Transparent Informational System 
As previously mentioned, an administrative body is only as 
successful as the information it is able to obtain. “Information is a scarce 
and valued commodity” in international relations.185 The international 
community has recognized that scientific research regarding 
transboundary aquifers, especially large ones, is extremely difficult to 
acquire because of the lack of financial resources.186 The technology to 
obtain information about transboundary aquifers is available, however, 
the finances to implement the technology are not. Functional institutions 
can help reduce costs and mitigate the burden of any single state. 
Although a lack of finances is a natural roadblock for most 
developing countries, it is not a complete hindrance. In fact, many 
institutions are known to reduce costs to member states in the long run.187 
Without an informational institution, each state would be responsible for 
obtaining and gathering data regarding the aquifer. However, if each 
state contributes that money to a long-term informational institution, it 
will be less expensive than having to create and sustain a system 
individually. Additionally, a system with up-to-date and uniform 
information will make co-operation with member states as well as 
outside actors easier.  
The Nubian Aquifer’s informational system, NARIS, has been 
recognized as a crucial component to the Nubian Aquifer’s future.188 
Similarly, any potential framework will not only have to recognize the 
importance of continuous information, but also establish a system for the 
information to be easily accessed and updated. Similar to NARIS and 
other international treaties, each state will be required to exchange 
information with the informational institution and other member states. 
This type of informational institution also allows the administrative body 
to monitor each state’s use of the aquifer. Additionally, each state would 
                                                          
185.  Aceves, supra note 30, at 250.   
186.  See David N. Cassuto & Romulo S.R. Sampaio, Hard, Soft & Uncertain: 
The Guarani Aquifer and the Challenges of Transboundary Groundwater, 24 COLO. J. 
INT’L EVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013) (discussing the current problems regarding setting up 
multi-lateral water management framework).  
187.  Aceves, supra note 30, at 244.  
188.  See 2013 Press Release, supra note 112. 
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be immediately put on notice when there is over-exploitation, pollution, 
or other threats to the shared resource.189  
At minimum, developing countries can begin to track the current 
information they do have about the shared resource. An informational 
system with transparency and authority to gather information will reduce 
costs for the member states and will be an effective tool to monitor any 
potential threats to the aquifer.  
C. System to Determine Reasonable and Equitable Use 
One major threat to all transboundary aquifers is the threat of over-
exploitation.190 Non-rechargeable aquifers are particularly susceptible to 
over-exploitation because once tapped into, they permanently lower the 
amount of water in the region.191 With an increase in demand for water 
around the world, it is apparent these resources will continue to be 
exploited. However, with a lack of information and universal need for 
water, rigid rules regarding apportionment of any watercourse can be 
problematic. 
Although the Joint Authority has the ability to implement policy and 
ration member states’ use of the Nubian Aquifer, there is no clear 
delineation of the water resource among the four member states. Future 
management frameworks should have factors embedded in the 
administrative body to determine if each state’s use is equitable and 
reasonable. 
The TBA Articles identify several factors to help determine whether 
a state’s utilization of an aquifer is equitable and reasonable.192 An 
apportionment system’s main focus is to make sure each state’s 
utilization is maximizing the benefits of the aquifer and minimizing any 
foreseeable harm. However, factors relevant specifically to non-
rechargeable aquifers can be further divided into four categories: (1) 
each state’s social, economic, and other needs;193 (2) natural 
characteristics of the aquifer;194 (3) the aquifer’s role in the affected 
                                                          
189.  QUEVAUVILLER, supra note 16, at 13.  
190.  Id.  
191.  Conceptual Models for Transboundary Aquifers, supra note 18, at 685. 
192.  TBA Articles, supra note 24, art. 5.  
193.  Id. art. 5(a)-(b).  
194. Id. art. 5(c)-(d).  
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states;195 and (4) the ability to develop, protect, and conserve the 
aquifer.196  
An apportionment institution is necessary because the risk of over-
exploitation is too great, especially in dry, arid states. An institution that 
monitors and establishes proper usage of the aquifer will ensure that any 
threats to the aquifer are traced back to the responsible parties. State 
discussion of how the several factors are applied to each member state 
will force states to determine and better understand their respective rights 
and obligations regarding the shared resource.197 
The first factor is important to consider because the social and 
economic demographics of each state directly affect the state’s use of the 
aquifer. Developing countries will likely not have economically viable 
options available to provide water in other ways. Whereas more 
industrialized countries, with more economic resources, are in a much 
better position to protect and preserve the aquifer; however, this should 
not be the only determining factor. The second factor considers the 
scientific information about the natural characteristics of the aquifer, 
which includes geographic features, recharge rates, recharge zones, and 
other related data.  
The third and fourth factors consider the aquifer states collectively. 
The third factor looks at the aquifer’s role in the surrounding area 
because non-rechargeable aquifers have the ability to permanently 
reduce the water table in an entire region. The fourth factor considers the 
entire region’s ability to develop, protect, and conserve the aquifer. This 
factor will look different in arid regions that have little to no water 
access. States in these arid regions will be forced to balance satisfying 
humans basic rights and preserving the aquifer for a future 
generations.198 Thus, an apportionment system that recognizes an 
aquifer’s ability to provide basic human needs has the utmost 
importance.  
                                                          
195. Id. art. 5(i).  
196. See id. art. 5(f), 5(g), 5(h).  
197. See Aceves, supra note 30, at 247.  
198. See Russel Frink, Comment, Preserving Trans-Boundary Aquifers: A 
Precious Resource for Our Future Generation, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & 
DEV. L. J. 503, 508-524 (2013); See e.g., Berlin Rules, supra note 67, art. 14; TBA 
Articles, supra note 24, art. 5(2); Watercourse Convention, supra note 53, art. 10(2).  
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D. Current Transboundary Aquifers in Danger 
Various transboundary aquifers still lack any management 
framework, and several aquifers are in extreme danger of over-
exploitation.199 This article’s proposed framework can be a stepping-
stone to successfully managing any aquifer currently in danger. Below 
is a list of transboundary aquifers that could apply this framework:  
 Arabian Aquifer System (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Syria, UAE, Yemen);200  
 Indus Basin (India, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan);201  
 Murzuk-Djado Basin (Libya, Chad, Niger);202 
 Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin (India, China, Nepal, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan);203 and 
 Northwest Saharan Aquifer System (Algeria, Libya, 
Tunisa).204 
All of these transboundary aquifers do not have any management 
framework outlining efficient utilization of vital resources. Currently, 
many Arab states are in negotiations to adopt a “Framework Convention 
on Shared Water Resources between Arab States” to address many of the 
threats to aquifers.205 The aquifer states mentioned above can look to the 
Nubian Aquifer’s framework as a hopeful example to implement a 
proposed management framework. Most aquifer states are developing 
countries and primarily use the water from these aquifers for agricultural 
needs.206 An institutional approach, based on the three institutions 
mentioned above, will allow developing states to start looking at how 
their actions directly affect the aquifer system and the surrounding states.  
Future aquifer frameworks can build on the knowledge already 
collected by international organizations and use the Nubian Aquifer’s 
                                                          
199.  CEO Briefing: Global Depletion of Aquifers, EARTH SECURITY GROUP 
[ESG] (2016), http://earthsecuritygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ESG-Brief-
Aquifers.pdf (the article gives a detailed analysis of the threats to the top ten most 
vulnerable aquifers in the world).  
200.  Id. at 8.  
201.  Id.  
202.  Id. at 9.  
203.  Id. at 8.  
204.  Id. at 9.  
205.  Id.  
206.  Id. at 8, 9.  
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SAP to create tailored institutions that take on many of the principles 
discussed in this article. At the very least, SAP can be used as a 
successful example to bring states to the negotiating table to discuss the 
possibility of proper management institutions collectively or 
independently.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although our world is facing looming problems that appear 
unsolvable, human society has thrived due to adaptation and innovation. 
Similar to the parable of the “last tree” in Easter Island, humans will 
continue to adapt and look for new solutions to solve the world’s 
problems. The supply of water will not increase, but society can still 
create manageable institutional frameworks that will efficiently utilize 
these vital resources. Institutions will not only solve current exploitation 
problems, but will create discussions for saving the future of mankind.  
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